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BACK TO BASICS: Mahan for the 1990s
James J. Tritten
For Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan the objective of a
navy was to establish sea control, to ensure the unfettered use
of the oceans for economic and political benefit in peace and
war. The intervening one hundred and fifty years have not
changed this basic goal. As technologies have advanced,
international relations grew more complex, and bureaucracies have
multiplied, this basic maritime goal has been obscured. Perhaps
it is time to review Mahan ' s basics of maritime policy and
strategy from today's perspective.
MAHAN ON NAVAL STRATEGY
Western navies must maintain the capability to control the
sealines of communication (SLOCs) during war so that shipping can
voyage from one theater to another and support the land war.
Control of the SLOCs may be obtained either by destroying the
enemy battle fleet, or preventing that fleet by other means from
attaining its mission.
Battle and Blockade
Mahan posited two primary methods of ensuring control over
ocean areas. The first is a decisive battle in which fleet is
pitted against fleet. The victorious fleet destroys the opposing
force so that no ships remain to threaten the SLOCs. This was the
preferred method of Mahan 's era and remains the strategy of
choice today.
A decisive naval battle remains a distinct possibility,
although it has assumed forms undreamed in Mahan's day. Fleets
may now engage without ever sighting each other. They may also be
engaged by other services in the maritime theater, or be
supported by them. Air support, modern electronics, space
surveillance, nuclear weapons, and long range, land-based
missiles have changed the parameters of armed conflict.
An equally acceptable method of gaining sea control is to
contain an opposing force, blockaded in port or in restricted
waters, where it cannot affect the SLOCs. This is more difficult
today since submarine and land-based missile forces can remain in
port and effectively cut the SLOCs at the terminals. However,
blockades are effective and are used, witness the recent events
in the South Atlantic. They are still planned for, as documented
by the basic operational concepts behind our Navy Maritime
Strategy.
There are special areas of the oceans where alternative
methods of attaining sea control have been used. For instance, in
the Caribbean, control of harbors and bases used to support
cruisers engaged in commerce raiding, was an acceptable
alternative to eliminating the cruisers. Similarly, Mahan pointed
out the value to Great Britain of controlling key straits and
coaling stations in the Royal Navy's ability to control the seas.
This lesson has not been lost on the Russian "bear" who is
extending his overseas presence in an attempt to do the same.
In general, Mahan saw little utility in a war against ports
and bases without mutually reinforcing naval power exercised on
the oceans. He also saw little use in random patrols over the
vast open oceans as a method of sea control. Instead he favored
seeking out the enemy's Navy and either engaging it or keeping it
bottled up.
For Mahan, naval engagements ensured that shipping would flow
and wealth would continue to accumulate to the State. Today we
still must exercise sea control in crisis or war to ensure that
vital raw materials, finished products, and energy resources are
delivered, and that men and material can be shipped from bases in
the strategic reserve to wherever they are needed.
History records that large ships with superior firepower are
often decisive in attaining victory at sea. Mahan documented
classic battles between the CONSTITUTION and the GUERRIERE, and
the WASP and FROLIC to illustrate the point that "advantage in
maneuvering greatly increases the ability of the inferior to
serve his own cause, but does not constitute superiority."
Firepower alone, however, cannot win every battle. More often a
combination of firepower, maneuverability, and decision-making is
crucial to victory at sea. Rodney's cutting into the battle line
at the Battle of the Saints, the CONSTITUTION against JAVA; and
actions during the Battle of Lake Erie are such examples.
Maneuver alone rarely determines the outcome of naval battle.
Fortunately for the embryonic United States, the strategic
maneuver of the Comte de Grasse in bringing his fleet to the
Virginia Cape proved critical in the outcome of the Yorktown
campaign and thus the entire war.
These largest of ships, however, are not always available in
war due to a restrictive political climate, economic constraints,
or operational factors such as great distances or base locations.
The Soviet Union did not have a balanced fleet at the outbreak of
the Great Patriotic War due to political and economic decisions
made at the highest levels of the Party and government, despite
the demands of sound naval theory and recommendations by the Navy
to create such a fleet. Thus, it is not sufficient to adopt good
military theories: successfully convincing political leaders is
equally necessary.
Battle Strategy
The concentration of firepower at critical junctures is
generally critical in deciding military operations. Hence, Mahan
favored combining resources and fighting forces, and argued
against splitting the fleet. Mahan recognized the need to manage
perceptions by providing an illusion of weakness. Forces could be
split locally into main and reserve fleets. The decision,
therefore, when to combine forces and commit strategic reserves
2to battle is as crucial as deciding the method of main attack.
Whether, or when, to initiate hostilities is another
monumental decision facing the naval commander. Engagement should
be avoided until some critical advantage is gained. In the War of
1812, Mahan was extremely critical of the American government
because it declared war and initiated ill-timed hostilities. The
U.S. government failed to direct its Navy to immediately raid
unalerted British merchants in North American waters who had
insufficient escorts to protect them. Seizing the initiative and
maximizing opportunities should be initiated regarding vulnerable
targets (such as Soviet merchant, research, fishing and
intelligence fleets) in any future war.
Surprise can often turn the tide of a naval encounter. Mahan
had only praise for Nelson's resourcefulness and innovative dusk
attack on the French at Aboukir. Countering a possible surprise
Soviet attack poses a dilemma for Western naval forces. NATO is a
defensive alliance, with no aggressive plans to strike first.
This means that naval force levels must be robust enough to
absorb losses incurred by a Soviet first strike, or that naval
forces must have rules of engagement that differ from those given
to land armies. Western navies could, of course, enhance the
survivability of vital assets by not deploying them in forward
exposed areas, but such an obvious shift in policy might send
unwanted signals. Projecting an unwillingness to fully use the
seas could undermine the perception vital to deterrence of a
determination to exercise power.
Where to fight is a further concern to naval strategists.
For a coastal state like the United States, the Navy is the first
line of defense, and should be employed as close to an enemy's
coastline as possible. "The front of operations of a powerful
fleet should be pushed as far towards the enemy as is consistent
with the mutual support of the various detachments, and with
secure communication with their base. . .the navy is the first
3line of defense. . .
"
Our national forward based defense doctrine of committing
land forces in peacetime to Europe and Asia is an outgrowth of
this philosophy, together with the determination to fight all
future land wars on foreign soil rather than in the homeland. To
sustain them, our forces require adequate logistical support,
which must come via the sea.
Obviously, one should fight and win at decisive geographical
points. In sea warfare, such foci are often located at
strategically important narrow waterways or "choke points."
However, a direct assault on choke points is not always the
optimum answer. An indirect approach may be warranted. For
example, Mahan wrote that to take Gibraltar, the Spanish should
have threatened the English Channel, causing the British to
withdraw from peripheral outposts to defend the homeland.
Napoleon adopted an indirect strategy when he attempted to reach
London via Egypt. Mahan argued that he should have instead
attacked the real basis of British power - the Royal Navy and
commercial shipping. If American power is indeed dependent upon
the ability to use the seas, should we not anticipate Soviet
moves to blunt that strength, in war and peace?
American victories in Canada during the War of 1812 were
tactically brilliant, but never achieved the desired political
results. Perhaps, had the U.S. directed its operations against
the sea power which sustained British forces in Canada, victory
in the war might have come more readily. The point is that
confronting the enemy may sometimes be the right thing to do, but
as often it is not.
Mahan credited the Comte De Grasse with the successful
conclusion of the American War of Independence. But he was
clearly disappointed with him when, following his brilliant
maneuver in support of Yorktown, De Grasse fought the British in
the West Indies and failed to take the initiative and attack
while he had the advantage. De Grasse suffered a major defeat in
what Mahan calls the greatest naval battle of the 18th century,
the Battle of the Saints.
Where to fight is a strategic decision which should be made
once the objectives of the campaign have been decided. Mahan'
s
clear message is that, in many of the wars he studied, the
objectives were not properly identified. Where to fight is a
contemporary problem for NATO planners. Some future naval
campaigns are relatively predictable: the Baltic exits, against
Western high value units in the Mediterranean, and at SLOC
terminals. But what of the Norwegian and Barents Seas and the
polar region?
The dilemma of course, is that to fight in the Arctic
reguires the most robust types of Allied naval forces, which are
the most expensive and the most difficult to procure. Battle here
could provide the Soviet's advantages of supporting air power and
surveillance. Failure to say NATO will fight in the Norwegian
Sea, however, implies that a member of the Alliance might be
largely abandoned. In addition, the Soviet fleet could usurp
control and use portions of the sea in a manner that is contrary
to Allied war termination aims.
Finally, when to terminate a battle is a decision which
often proves critical. Perry exercised sound judgment when he
chose to temporarily stand down in the face of unexpected,
superior British firepower in the Battle of Lake Erie. Likewise,
Nelson's actions at Copenhagen resulted in an early victory,
minimized losses to both sides, and did not leave the loser
needlessly embittered. What type planning, if any, goes on
inside the Pentagon concerning how to terminate wars?
Sea Control
A major topic of debate over the procurement of American
naval forces today is whether those forces contribute to sea
control, especially those that support SLOC protection. Sea
control forces may have a better chance of support in Congress
than those described as being designed for offensive power
projection. Some in Congress believe that sea control forces are
less expensive.
By remaining on the defensive in convoys and avoiding battle
unless engaged by an enemy, Western Navies would be guilty of the
same mistakes which Mahan attributed to the French when they
fought the British for control of world empires. If we adopt a
defensive posture of local sea control with convoy assets, we are
inviting disaster.
Sea control of the Atlantic SLOCs requires using "power
projection," blockading Soviet assets to keep the bulk of the
Soviet Navy bottled in the Baltic, the Eastern Mediterranean, the
Black Sea, and north of the G-I-UK gap. Sea control of the North
Atlantic will demand "power projection" assets to handle Soviet
fleet units caught outside the protective umbrella of "bastion"
defensive areas. It will require advanced (not inexpensive)
"defensive" convoy assets as point defense against high
technology "leakers." Sea control of the North Atlantic will
require our most sophisticated subsurface, surface, and air
assets to project NATO naval power or defend mid-ocean areas
where the Soviets may choose to fight a war of attrition. Those
operations are crucial to allow our reinforcements and supplies
to get through to Europe, and allow raw materials and finished
products to arrive safely in North America.
Building before a war the right types and numbers of ships
for duty during that war is difficult for many reasons. Social
scientists have yet to predict accurately when wars will occur.
The ships that often prove decisive during a war are commonly
those viewed as too expensive before that war. Mahan records a
debate over the type of navy needed and actually procured before
the War of 1812 and reminds us that purchasing the right kind of
ships before the war would have been far less costly than the war
itself.
The Soviet Union faces similar problems. Its MOSKVA and
KIEV class air-capable ships are of limited value during a war
with NATO. Yet these same ships have potential utility during
lesser conflicts, crises, and for peacetime presence.
Although Mahan had little use for guerre de course, the
late Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov understood how submarines,
properly supported, could have affected the outcome of both World
Wars. The Soviet Navy has built impressive but inexpensive sea-
denial forces which often sail in company with Western high value
units. These Soviet assets can be expected to strike first and
attempt to eliminate Western forces vital to Allied sea control
and power projection. If successful, technologically inferior
KIEV and BREZHNEV class carriers could traverse the G-I-UK gap
and threaten any surviving NATO forces.
Mahan on Naval Policy
Mahan affirmed that six conditions affect the sea power of
States. These conditions are: (1) geographical position, (2)
physical conformation, (3) extent of territory, (4) population,
(5) character of people, and (6) character of government. For
our purposes these conditions are combined into the three broader
categories of geography, people and government, and will be
examined for their relevance to current policy.
Geography
Beneficial geographic position remains a significant
advantage that enables certain states to become major sea powers.
Great Britain and the United States have capitalized on this, and
retain certain intrinsic and distinct maritime advantages. Poor
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geographical position is a liability, as in the case of the
Soviet Union. However, achievement of great power status does not
depend entirely upon maritime position, and the Soviet Union
became a superpower without being a great sea power.
Mahan included in his geographical analysis the necessity to
extend one's territory to provide markets for a nation's
products, and to support the SLOCs to those markets. The need for
coaling stations and overseas bases to defend and support the
SLOCs has somewhat, but not entirely, diminished in an age of
large ships and nuclear power. Due to geographic realities, sea
power is crucial for healthy American, Japanese, Middle-Eastern
and European economies. To sustain sea control operations or
maintain a peacetime presence, substantial foreign-based
logistical support is still required.
For the United States, logistical support depends on using
American or Allied facilities or foreign/ joint bases and ports.
British success in the Falklands War was successful due, in part,
to the presence of a relatively obscure island (Ascension) in the
South Atlantic. The preferred Soviet method of replenishment is
to use Naval Auxiliaries or civilian merchant ships to purchase
consumables in foreign ports and resupply warships and
auxiliaries at sea. This minimizes the necessity for formal
overseas bases. Either way, as much as navies like to advertise
their freedom from cumbersome logistical tails, they are still
tied to supporting overseas stations and friendly ports of call.
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Perhaps the most important aspect of geography and sea
power, however, is that despite the great importance of overseas
bases and SLOCs, the great issues of war and peace are determined
on land. Those of us concerned with navies and maritime power
must not forget that sea power alone cannot "win the war" against
a continental power. On the other hand, without sea power,
national greatness or political victory may not be possible. The
simple realities of geography and a rational desire to maintain a
formal political, military and economic presence abroad destines
the United States to be a maritime nation.
People
Although favorable geographic position is vital for a
successful sea power, Mahan gives ultimate preeminance to people
and their character. Simply put, there must be a population
sufficient to defend the territory, man the ships, and comprise
a reserve manpower pool for the maritime forces required in war
and peace.
Overall numbers of people, however, are not enough. The
population must have a maritime outlook including a tradition of
trading and taking that trade to sea. There must be a supporting
industrial infrastructure to provide commodities for commerce,
shipbuilding, ship repair, and other trades necessary to build
and outfit ships. This infrastructure sustains either peaceful
commerce or a war effort.
The Soviet Union has increased its presence at sea with its
Navy. The Soviet merchant, fishing, and research fleets also
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raise the level of consciousness of the sea for a nation which is
traditionally landbound. Raising this consciousness, their
willingness to support naval power is enhanced. By the same
token, we should consider whether the United States has lost its
i
maritime consciousness.
Mahan studied the history of the maritime campaigns of 1600-
1812, to determine whether any strategic lessons could be
deduced. Perhaps most obvious is that a State needs ships to
fight at sea, and men to fight those ships. Most important is the
need for good Navy seamen. Mahan noted that the French lost as
many ships to poor seamanship as the English and Dutch did to
enemy action in at Beachy Head, a major battle during the War of
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the League of Augsburg. When faced with a choice between good
men or good ships, Mahan came squarely down on the side of good
men, even if it meant sailing them in less than optimal ships.
Mahan argued that Navy men must be real Navy men, schooled
in naval tactics, aggressive, innovative, and thoroughly familiar
with their weapons systems and the sea. They needed to train
their crews constantly and exercise while underway. Mahan saw no
substitute for the training and experience that operations at
sea provided.
Western navies have not forgotten this lesson through
inattention or indifference, but have been forced to reduce
steaming days by budget constraints. The Soviets are similarly
constrained, and spend much time at anchor while deployed
overseas. Perhaps this is the price Admirals Gorshkov and
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Chernavin had to pay to obtain the large numbers of ships they
desired. Will the Soviets, or will we, have the depth of
experience required when forced to operate in sustained at-sea
operations? Developing the skills needed to win battles at sea
requires constant training which can be done only at sea and
underway, which costs money.
Mahan saw only one type of warrior mentality which would
lead to victory: innovative, aggressive, and offensive campaigns
which would result in the elimination (or neutralization) of all
enemy opposition. A defensively oriented mindset allows the enemy
the choice of when to fight, stifles initiative and results in
officers who actively seek to avoid battle or are incapable of
attaining victory if forced to engage. The U.S. Navy has a
tradition of promoting and retaining aggressive officers who are
capable of taking the risks necessary to win battles. The Soviet
Union, on the other hand, treats innovation as taking aggressive
actions to carry out the initial plan even in the face of
unexpected obstacles.
Another topical issue is "should one fight as one trains?"
How one practices depends on formal naval policy, leadership,
seamanship, good discipline, and organization among other
factors. Most of these are determinable in peace prior to a war.
One cannot routinely count on the brilliance of a Suffren or a
Comte de Grasse surfacing, ignoring faulty policy and taking
decisive actions.
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Mahan also discouraged dependence on assistance from
allies, especially if the ally was party to a civil war. One
wonders how much the Soviet Union counts on support from its
"fraternal" allied navies. If a naval force is to be sent to
perform a task, sufficient national forces should be sent to
complete the operation unassisted. Yet today, NATO sea control of
the Atlantic depends upon the unverifiable cooperative effort of
all the Allied navies; maritime superiority requires a coalition
strategy; the Maritime Strategy assumes cooperation by critical
nations. Are there plans to fight wars in Europe by American
forces without the active participation of those nations?
Government
Mahan wrote that national character and geographic position
were the two crucial conditions affecting sea power. He concluded
that governments could also be extremely helpful but rarely were.
Governments which fully understood the nature of sea power were
the exception rather than the rule. Popular forms of government,
Mahan argued, were particularly remiss at funding peacetime
military establishments.
The cost of actually fighting a war contrasted to the cost
of adequate peacetime preparation is one of the major issues
which Mahan addressed in his study of the War of 1812. Mahan
urged his readers to ignore the splendid but peripheral
individual victories and battles, especially the then-popular
Battle of New Orleans. Instead, he advised concentrate on the
effects of the British commercial blockade, which ruined the
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American economy, and on the lack of adequate military
preparation, which could have deterred the War.
Mahan argued that America had the geographic position and
national character necessary to enter the ranks of great powers.
It appeared to him that only the government was holding the U.S.
back from achieving the greatness it deserved. The opportunity
was ripe, in the late 1800s, to replace Great Britain as the
dominant power in the Caribbean and South America, but government
leadership and support were necessary but lacking.
Funding adequate military and naval power in times of peace
has often been difficult. It will surely be even more difficult
in the next decade. Despite its reputation as a great maritime
nation, even Great Britain entered many maritime wars not fully
prepared. Hence Mahan' s choice was to argue not for a Navy, but
rather for commercial sea power which, he knew, would generate a
requirement for naval power to protect it. Navies require
substantial resources from a State to grow and be sustained
during war, and these resources could be increased in the 1800s
by the accumulation of wealth from overseas colonies and sea
trade between them and a mother country. Today we have no simple
remedy to generate the resources necessary to sustain our sea
power
.
Mahan also recognized that the infrastructure of
shipbuilding, outfitters, and ship repairmen which was crucial to
a Navy in time of war, needed to be sustained by commercial
ventures in times of peace. Civilian merchant seamen constituted
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a reserve pool of manpower which the Royal Navy expected to tap
when needed. This interrelationship between civilian sea power
and the Navy remains valid today.
Navies alone cannot hope to carry out national strategies in
support of forward operations and long wars. For this, the nation
must look to its civilian fleet and shipbuilding capacity. No
finer example can be found than the Falklands campaign, and the
response of the British maritime industry. Its rapid
implementation of contingency plans is a rousing example for
other maritime nations to follow. Some 59 ships were taken from
commercial service, and 45 actively utilized. Flight decks were
improvised, underway replenishment eguipment was added, and
fishing craft were commissioned as minesweepers. Most maritime
ships kept their civilian crews, supplemented only by small Navy
or Royal Fleet Auxiliary contingents.
The West must maintain the capability to fight a sustained
conventional war in order to deter one. The acknowledged capacity
to sustain the war effort longer than the adversary can sustain
its effort is central to deterrence. This capacity requires
shipyards to rehabilitate our reserve warships and merchants, to
repair battle damaged warships, to make good initial combat
losses, and to provide a sustained sealift capability.
Western navies lack sufficient State owned resources to
carry out these strategies. It is national policy that the
civilian sector and reserve forces provide the necessary
resources to fight and win a long war. In peace we need to
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sustain that capability for national defense reasons even if it
is economically inefficient. Sustaining civilian shipbuilding,
ship repair, a Merchant Marine, and men in the varying seafaring
trades is costly, just as is the current rebuilding of the fleet
itself. Our maritime industry is part of our national defense
force necessary to deter war.
Today, the Soviet Merchant Marine challenges the West in
the world's shipping trades. Even competing at fair rates, their
state supported operations are causing Western shippers and
shipbuilders to fail. If this continues, the manpower needed to
sail our merchant fleet will dwindle. Ship repair yards will
fold, as will shipbuilders. The Soviets know we need our Merchant
Marine for our defense policies. What better way for the Soviets
to eliminate this important vital component? What finer example
is there of a competitive strategy?
National defense is not a profit making venture. It is time
to admit that the civilian aspects of sea power are a vital form
of national defense and need our continuous support. If we turn
from the sea, will we not be making the same mistake Mahan
asserted the French made when they abandoned efforts to contest
British naval supremacy?
There are some very real economic arguments against
maintaining Western military and merchant sea power. However,
unless we are prepared to fight our battles over "here" rather
than over "there," we cannot abandon the sea and forward defense.
There is no guarantee that future hostilities will be either
18
nuclear or so short as to make sustainability irrelevant. To
execute the strategy for deterring or fighting a conventional or
long war, military and civilian sea power are vital. Sea power is
also vital to deterrence of conventional war by threatening to
deny victory to any aggressor. Therefore sea power must be
i
supported, and if necessary, subsidized by the government.
Mahan challenged the U. S. government to determine its need
for sea power in order to take its place among the great powers.
There were substantial economic and political rewards to be
reaped. Today we face a similar challenge. If Western military
doctrines and strategy are to remain centered around forward
defense, horizontal escalation and escalation over time; and if
deterrence is achieved by threatening to either deny victory to
an enemy or to punish him for excesses, the civilian components
of sea power and the necessary supporting naval power must be
built and maintained.
It is not enough to have the forces that deter war by
threatening to escalate vertically to nuclear weapons. Deterrence
also depends upon the ability to fight a sustained conventional
conflict - a longer war than the enemy can manage - and in any
region of the globe. This, combined with our forward defense
doctrine, dictates a capability to reinforce and resupply any
overseas location.
Mahan had strong opinions about the internal working
relationships between governments and navies. He saw government's
role as setting policy and priority, while the Naval service
19
should be trusted to decide the best way to carry out those
policies. Wherever government meddled and dictated means to
navies Mahan was quick to point out the disastrous results. If
the population and the government can be convinced to fund a
Navy, the next step is for the Navy to ensure that the correct
types of forces are built. This decision should properly be left
to the Navy .
In discussing which types of ships should have been built
prior to the War of 1812, Mahan concluded that a mere squadron of
sloops instead of "Jeffs" gunboats would probably have been
sufficient to carry out a successful war on commerce. Such a
squadron could have been used in coordinated attacks against
British shipping in nearby Caribbean waters to strike a lethal
blow at the economic and sea power which sustained the British
war effort.
When non-maritime government officials dictate the types of
ships to build to carry out policy, the results are often
disastrous. Mahan 's study of the War of 1812 documents President
Thomas Jefferson's inexperience in nautical affairs and his
insistence on building many smaller ships instead of fewer larger
ones. Mahan recounts a similar debate in the Royal Navy when
Napoleon built a fleet a small ships and boats to invade Britain.
The Admiralty, knowing of this new threat, wisely stuck to larger
ships of the line, and thus had the forces and trained men to




Of interest is the opinions of the late Fleet Admiral
Gorshkov on who should make decisions about what types of ships
are needed in the fleet:
"The closer attention paid by the leaders taking
crucial decisions on the development of the navy to the
recommendations of the research institutions and the
views of naval officers on active service and their
appreciation of the possibilities of industry, the
sounder will be their decisions and the more painless
the process of building the fleet, and in the end the
less it will cost to build and the more powerful it
will be. "8
Conclusion
Mahan has much to say to us. The basic naval goal remains
free use of the seas in peace and war. Clearly, the United States
today has enough of Mahan 's indices of geography, population and
government to achieve sea control. Only the will is in doubt.
That will can be supplied by rational appraisal of our goals and
necessities
.
Our first goal is to deter all war, nuclear and
conventional. We have learned that deterrence stems from
strength. Failing deterrence, our second goal is to keep the war
away from the homeland. Sea control is essential to forward
defense. If we cannot supply our troops over "there," and if we
cannot sustain the war effort over time, surely we will have to
fight over "here." Peacetime support of the Navy and fostering
civilian maritime industry is as necessary today as in Mahan'
s
time. These forces are expensive to maintain, but the alternative
is to risk the unthinkable.
21
Rather than consider Mahan and similar military and naval
historians unnecessary due to obsolesence of fighting machines,
the United States military services should assume leadership
roles in sponsoring military history as a legitimate academic
discipline. We have endless pre-war theories how combat will
occur and how effective weapons systems will be. The study of
actual combat, not theoretical combat, remains the best way to
learn how men actually respond under fire, and the accuracy of
pre-war predictions and concepts. Why study Mahan in the Twenty-
first century? Because we cannot afford not to.
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